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Chapter 1  Supervenience and Identity
1.1  Introduction
Like many other contemporary philosophers, I have strong physicalist intuitions.  I am 
inclined to think that chemical phenomena, for example, are all at bottom physical, 
even though chemists do not describe those phenomena in physical terms.  What is 
more, I am inclined to think the same about the phenomena studied by meteorology, 
biology, psychology, sociology and the other so-called "special sciences".
   My aim in this initial chapter is to see how far such physicalist intuitions can be 
supported by serious arguments.  This question is not as much discussed in the 
contemporary philosophical literature as it might be.  Of course many philosophers 
with physicalist inclinations have formulated different possible versions of 
physicalism, and explored the relations between them.  And many other philosophers, 
with opposed inclinations, have elaborated various non-physicalist views of 
psychology, biology, sociology, and other special phenomena.  But for the most part 
neither party has paused to argue its case against the other.  The friends of 
physicalism tend simply to start with their physicalist intuitions, and try to develop a 
theory which fits them.  Their opponents dismiss those intuitions out of hand as 
symptoms of an overblown admiration for science.
   Not all philosophers treat physicalism as beyond debate in this way.  An increasing 
number of contemporary thinkers are coming to recognize that there are plenty of 
pertinent arguments that bear on the issue.1  Dogmatic physicalists and anti-
physicalists alike will do well to attend to these arguments.  Anti-physicalists will 
discover that physicalism is supported by premises which are difficult to deny, even if 
you have little regard for science.  And physicalists will find out why some versions 
of physicalism are defensible, while others are not.
1.2  Supervenience 
Let me start by trying to be a bit more precise about what I mean by physicalism.  
One simple way of formulating physicalism would be to require that all special 
properties, like chemical, or biological, of psychological properties, should be 
identified as types with physical properities, in the way that the property of being 
hydrogen, say, can be identified with the physical property of having atoms with one 
proton and one electron.  But while such "type identities" may be available within 
basic chemistry, they seem unlikely to characterize the other special sciences.  In 
particular, it seems unlikely that psychological properties, such as being worried 
about the future, for example, can be identified with any specific physical properties, 
along the lines of having a certain arrangement of molecules in your head.  It is surely 
implausible to suppose that all the different people who have ever been worried about 
the future must have some intra-cranial molecular property in common.  And, if that is 
not implausible enough, what about the future brain-injured people who will have 
their damaged parts replaced by miracles of silicon-based micro-technology, or the 
hominid but silicon-based denizens of Proxima Centauri's third planet?  Presumably 
they will be able to worry about the future too.  But they can't possibly share 
molecular arrangements with the rest of us, given that we don't have any silicon in our 
brains.
   Fortunately for physicalism, type identity is not the only way in which special 
properties can be viewed as essentially physical.  An alternative way of formulating 
physicalism is in terms of the supervenience of the special on the physical.  
Supervenience on the physical means that two systems cannot differ chemically, or 
biologically, or psychologically, or whatever, without differing physically;  or, to put 
it the other way round, if two systems are physically identical, then they must also be 
chemically identical, biologically identical, psychologically identical, and so on.
   The advantage of formulating physicalism in terms of supervenience is that, unlike 
type identity, this doesn't require that the same physical property must determine a 
given special property whenever it is instanced.  My worrying about the future might 
involve one molecular arrangement, an arrangement such that that anybody who has it 
will be worrying about the future; your worrying about the future might be ensured by 
a different physical arrangement, but again one that suffices to determine that all its 
possessors are worrying about the future;  future brain-damaged patients and Proxima 
Centaurians will have yet different such physical arrangements;  and so on.  
   How satisfactory an explication of physicalism is the requirement of supervenience 
on the physical?  I shall consider first whether supervenience is necessary for 
physicalism, second whether it is sufficient.
   On the face of it, supervenience seems an obvious necessary condition for 
physicalism in any given area:  if two chemical systems, say, can differ, even though 
they are physically identical, then it would seem to follow that they must contain 
something non-physical.
   However, an immediate qualification is needed.  Suppose two chemical samples are 
physically identical:  they contain exactly the same molecules and have exactly the 
same internal structure.  Nevertheless one may be heavier than the other, if one is one 
the earth and the other on the moon.  So the heaviness of chemical systems does not 
supervene on their physical characteristics.  Yet presumably we don't want on this 
account to regard physicalism as refuted by the heaviness of chemical samples.  If 
anything supervenes on physical characteristics, surely heaviness does.
   The obvious response to this problem is to note that heaviness is a relational 
property of chemical samples, depending not only on the intrinsic features of the 
sample, but also on the features of another system, namely, the surrounding 
gravitational field.  Accordingly, we should modify the requirement of supervenience, 
for relational properties, so as to demand that such properties should supervene, not 
on the internal physical characteristics of the system at issue, but rather on those plus 
the physical characteristics of the relevant related system.  If we do this, then the 
heaviness of chemical samples is no longer a counter-example to physicalism:  for the 
heaviness of a chemical sample obviously does supervene on the internal physics of 
the sample plus the physics of the surrounding gravitational field.  (Equivalently, if 
less naturally, we could say that the relational properties of a system were not really 
properties of that system as such, but only of some larger system incorporating the 
relevant related system, and then require that such relational properties supervene on 
the physical properties of the larger system.)2
   Given this qualification about relational properties, I shall take it henceforth that 
supervenience is a necessary condition for physicalism.  But is supervenience 
sufficient for physicalism?  This is a rather more tricky issue.  In outline, we can see 
how supervenience might suffice.  Supervenience says that, if two systems are 
physically identical, then they must also be chemically identical, biologically identical, 
psychologically identical, and so on.  That is, the shared physical features of these 
systems determine their special features.  But how could this be so, if anything non-
physical were required for those special features?
   Some care is needed, however, to make this line of thought watertight.  The issue 
depends on exactly how we understand supervenience, and in particular on how 
strongly we read the "determine" in "the shared physical features of these systems 
determine their special features".  In due course we shall see that there is a weak 
reading of this "determine" on which supervenience clearly does not suffice for 
physicalism, and a stronger reading on which supervenience does provide a 
satisfactory characterization of physicalism.  But let me not pause for these 
technicalities at this point.  My primary interest in this chapter, as I said, is not with 
the characterization of physicalism as such, but with the possibility of arguments 
which support physicalist views.  In line with this, it will make more sense for me to 
fill in the details of what I mean by physicalism once we have see what arguments are 
available, rather than before.   
   Perhaps it will be helpful to be graphic for a moment.  The world recognized by 
physicalism is at bottom a world consisting of physical facts, of particles and fields in 
motion through space.  At this basic level all facts can be described by strictly 
physical terminology, like "mass", "energy", and "position".  However, physicalism, 
as I am thinking of it, will also allow that we often use non-physical terminology, like 
"sulphuric acid", "thunderstorm", "elephant", and "thinking of the future", to group 
and categorize large-scale arrangements of physical facts.  Moreover, physicalism 
allows that such special terminology isn't just a shorthand for complex physical 
properties:  for, in those cases where type identity fails, special categories cannot even 
in principle be specified in physical terms.  Nevertheless, physicalists will say, the 
instances of any such special kind will still just be complexes of physical stuff.  For 
supervenience, in an appropriately strong sense, implies that nothing more is required 
for any special kind to be instanced than the physical facts should be thus-and-so.  
After all, if anything more were required, then presumably it would be possible for the 
special features of two systems to differ even though they were physically identical, 
which is just what supervenience rules out.
   So far we have been concerned only with what physicalism says.  It remains to 
consider whether we should believe it.  In the rest of this chapter I shall argue that 
physicalism is strongly supported by an important feature of physical science, namely, 
the internal completeness of physics.  However, before proceding, it will be helpful 
briefly to consider a number of further preliminary points that may be worrying some 
readers.
1.3  More Preliminaries
1.3.1  Some of you may feel uneasy about my brisk dismissal of the possibility of type 
identities between physical categories and special categories.  In particular, you may 
feel that if a special subject matter is scientific enough to contain projectible laws, 
then it would be surprising if its categories were not type identifiable with physical 
categories.  For why should we expect special categories to conform to any stable 
regularities, if they are determined by different physical structures on different 
occasions?
   I think this question points to a powerful, though not inescapable, argument for type 
identity, and shall devote the next chapter to it.  In this chapter, however, I shall focus 
on the prior issue of whether we should accept physicalism, understood in terms of 
supervenience.  Once we have decided this, we can then turn to the further issue of 
whether we should accept type identity as well.  My eventual conclusion will be that 
type identity holds for some, but not all special sciences:  more specifically it holds 
for those special sciences that lack a teleological underpinning.
1.3.2  In this chapter, and in much of the rest of this book, I shall speak as if our 
"common sense psychology", which attributes beliefs, desires and other familiar states 
to people, is a "special science".  But this is of course a contentious assumption.  
Many philosophers view everyday psychology as somehow incommensurable with 
science, as offering a quite different kind of understanding from science.  And other 
philosophers, while allowing that folk psychology may have pretensions to science, 
hold that it fails miserably to live up to them.
   I intend to by-pass this issue in most of the rest of this book, by stipulating that, 
unless I say otherwise, my use of folk psychological talk is to be understood as a 
place-holder for the true special science of psychology.  So philosophers who think 
that folk psychology is already a science can take my words at face value.  On the 
other hand, those who think something different is needed for a genuine cognitive 
science should simply understand my psychological talk as referring indirectly to their 
own favoured cognitive states.  There remain the pessimists who think that cognitive 
science of any kind is impossible, that there cannot be a theory of our cognitive 
workings that stands to our physics and physiology as meteorology, say, stands to the 
physics of the atmosphere.  To these pessimists I simply concede that if their bet 
about the future of cognitive science is right, then a number of the issues I address in 
this book do not arise.  (Though in fact the issue of this chapter, the relationship 
between the psychological and the physical3, arises not only for optimists who accept 
the possibility of a high-level psychological science, but also for those pessimists of a 
Wittgenstenian or Davidsonian bent who reject this possibility but nevertheless 
uphold everyday psychology as a respectable but non-scientific form of discourse.  
For they too need to consider the relationship between psychological states and brain 
states.  It is only pessimists who take the eliminativist line and reject high-level 
psychological thinking of any kind who can avoid addressing the mind-body problem.)
   My own view, for what it is worth, is that everyday psychology constitutes an 
impressive theory from a scientific point of view, capable of improvement and 
refinement, of course, and with a number of philosophically puzzling aspects, but 
certainly containing a great deal of predictive information, and quite probably giving 
some insight into the structure of our internal workings.  I prefer to avoid, however, 
debates about whether its undoubted imperfections merely mean it is a somewhat 
inaccurate theory about real entities (like nineteenth-century atomic theory), or 
whether they make it a false theory about imaginary entities (like the eighteenth-
century caloric theory of heat).  This issue would be hard enough to resolve if we 
knew the whole psychological truth (though then it wouldn't matter very much).  But, 
as it is, there are better things to think about.4
1.3.3  Among the ways in which psychology is philosophically puzzling is that it 
deals in propositional attitudes:  its explanations invoke beliefs, desires and other 
states which represent things as being a certain way.  (And we can expect the states of 
any future cognitive science to be similarly representational.)  In chapter 3 below I 
shall address the topic of mental representation.  At this stage we need only note that 
representation complicates the issue of the supervenience of the mental on the 
physical.   For, as a number of writers have observed5, there are many plausible cases 
of two people having physically identical brains, and yet having propositional 
attitudes with different representational contents.  These examples imply that 
psychological states individuated by representational content don't supervene on the 
physics of the brain.
   Physicalists about psychology have two options here.  They can argue that any such 
"broad" psychological state is really a kind of relational state, and that therefore, in 
the way indicated earlier in this chapter, physicalism only requires the supervenience 
of such states on the physical properties of some larger system which includes the 
individual's brain as a part.  Alternatively, they can argue that such broad states are 
not really part of serious psychological theory, and therefore that their non-
supervenience is not a problem for physicalism about serious psychology.  In what 
follows I shall defend the former line, in particular in sections 1.5 and 1.7 below.
1.4  The Completeness of Physics
Now for the arguments in favour of physicalism.  In what follows I shall consider two 
different such arguments.  But both arguments will hinge on what I shall call "the 
completeness of physics".  So in this section let me explain what I mean by this.  
   I take it that physics, unlike the other special sciences, is complete, in the sense that 
all physical events are either determined, or have their chances determined, by prior 
physical events according to physical laws.   In other words, we need never look 
beyond the realm of the physical in order to identify a set of antecedents which fixes 
the chances of any subsequent physical occurrence.  A purely physical specification, 
plus physical laws, will always suffice to tell us what is physically going to happen, 
insofar as that can be foretold at all.
   Note that not all subject areas are complete in this way.  For instance, meteorology 
is not complete.  Some weather phenomena arise from antecedents which are not 
themselves weather phenomena.  The beat of a butterfly's wing, students of chaos tell 
us, can play a part in determining next week's cyclone.  Less exotically, psychology is 
obviously not complete, given that plenty of mental events result from non-mental 
ones, as when I sit on a drawing pin and feel a pain.  But physics is special in this 
respect.  If we take any physical result, and look back in time to see what gave rise to 
it, then, I say, prior physical factors will always suffice to give us as full an 
explanation of that result as is possible.6
   I have stated the the completeness of physics baldly, as something to which all will 
assent.  But perhaps some readers will have doubts.  I can imagine two possible sorts 
of worry.  The first would be a general worry that the completeness of physics is an 
empirical claim and therefore inadmissible in a philosophical argument.  I have 
nothing to say to this beyond the points made earlier in the introduction to this book.  
The second worry would be more specific:  even if empirical claims are admissible in 
philosophy, is the completeness of physics really a well-supported empirical claim?  
In particular, what exactly does "physics" mean here?  On some perfectly natural 
ways of reading this term, the completeness of "physics" seems false.7  However, let 
me postpone discussion of this second worry to section 1.9 below.  For the moment it 
will be helpful take the completeness of physics at face value and see what would 
follow if it were true.   We will be better placed to evaluate queries about it when we 
see how it matters to physicalism.8
1.5  The Manifestability Argument for Supervenience
Consider now the following argument for the supervenience of psychology on physics.
Premise (1).  According to the completeness of physics, the chances of physical 
consequences are fixed, once physical antecedents are given.  So if two systems are 
physically identical and in the same physical contexts, they will issue in the same 
physical consequences or chances thereof.
Premise (2).  Now add in the assumption, which I shall call the "manifestability of the 
mental", that if two systems are mentally different, then there must be some physical 
contexts in which this difference will display itself in differential physical 
consequences, or at least in differential chances for such consequences. 
Conclusion.  It follows that mental differences without physical differences are 
impossible.  (1) tells us that physical identity guarantees identity of physical 
consequences or chances thereof.  And (2) tells us that mental difference requires the 
possibility of different physical consequences or chances thereof.  So physical identity 
rules out mental difference.9
   The crucial idea here is that the completeness of physics leaves no room for mental 
differences, or any other differences, to make a difference to physical consequences, 
once physical antecendents are given.  Physical categories by themselves always 
suffice to fix the chances of physical consequences, without the help of mental 
categories.  So the only way for mental differences to be manifestable is for them to 
have different physical bases.10
   The two premises to this argument are the completeness of physics and the 
manifestability of the mental.  As I said, I shall come back to the completeness of 
physics at the end of the chapter.  Here we need to consider the manifestability of the 
mental.  The most obvious argument for this principle would be that mental 
differences must always be capable of showing themselves in differential behaviour:  
there certainly seems something initially odd about the idea of two people who are 
mentally different, yet behave in the same way in all physical contexts.  (In this 
connection, note that the manifestability principle is not the strong requirement that 
every particular mental difference actually manifests itself in differential physical 
consequences;  just the weaker assumption that, for any type of mental difference, 
there is some type of physical context in which that difference would be physically 
manifested.)
   If this behavioural interpretation of the manifestability principle were acceptable, 
then a strong version of the supervenience of the psychological on the physical would 
follow, namely, the supervenience of psychological states on brain states.  For we 
could run the argument as follows.  Mental difference require behavioural differences.  
But behavioural difference are fixed specifically by prior brain states.  So there can't 
be mental differences without brain state differences.11
   However, there are good reasons for denying that all psychological states supervene 
on brain states  I am thinking here of the kind of "broad" propositional attitudes 
mentioned in section 1.3.3.  As we saw, the distinguishing characteristic of broad 
attitudes is that individuals with identical brains can fail to share them.  So it follows 
from the argument in the last paragraph that a manifestability requirement in terms of 
behavioural displays is too strong a requirement for broad attitudes.  And this is of 
course what we do find:  differences in in broad attitude don't automatically display 
themselves in behavioural differences.  To take a familar example, consider Carl, who 
wants a glass of H2O, and Lrac, his physically identical Twin Earth counterpart, who 
wants a glass of XYZ.  They have different broad attitudes.  But their behaviour, in 
the sense of the physical movements of their bodies, will be the same in all physical 
contexts. 
  As I observed in 1.3.3, the failure of broad attitudes to supervene on brain states does 
not mean that physicalism is false.  For if broad states are relational states, then it will 
suffice for physicalism that they supervene on the physics of the individual-system-
and-relevantly-related-systems, even if not on the physics of the individual system 
alone.  So it remains possible that the general manifestability argument for 
supervenience might still establish this weaker kind of supervenience for broad beliefs, 
even if not supervenience on brain states.  All we need is a weaker manifestability 
premise to the effect that differences in broad beliefs are somewhere manifested in 
physical consequences, even if they are not manifested in behavioural consequences.
   In defence of this weaker version of the manifestability premise, note that a mental 
difference which was not physically manifestable in any way would be radically 
undetectable.  We know that our sense organs work by physical interaction with the 
environment, as do the instruments and other aids by which we extend the power of 
our sense organs.  So if two different mental states yielded exactly the same physical 
manifestations in all contexts, then there would seem no possibility of our ever 
finding out about their difference.  Yet surely any real mental difference ought to be 
somehow detectable, even if not behaviourally.
   To illustrate this point, note that even the broad mental difference between Carl and 
his identical doppelganger Lrac will be distinguished by some differential physical 
consequences.  For this broad mental difference depends on the relational difference 
that, where Carl is surrounded by H2O, Lrac is surrounded by XYZ.  And this 
difference in their environments will obviously produce some differential physical 
consequences by which we can distinguish the two cases.
   I recognize that this defence of the manifestability requirement, and hence of 
supervenience, is less than fully principled.  For one thing, it leaves it open for 
opponents of physicalism to object that it is possible that there be mental differences 
that are not in any way detectable by human beings.  More pressingly, opponents of 
physicalism could also query whether our ability to detect mental differences always 
depends on physical interaction with our environments.  Thus anti-physicalists might 
argue that our access to conscious mental states in particular is primarily via 
introspection, rather than via the normal five senses, and that there is no immediate 
reason to suppose that the deliverances of introspection are mediated by physical 
processes, however it may be with the other senses.  This would then open the way for 
anti-physicalists to argue that conscious states might fail to supervene on physical 
goings-on, and so that conscious differences need not manifest themselves physically, 
and yet to hold that those differences could still be detectable, via introspection:  for 
example, they could argue that you could be in just the same physical state at two 
different times, and yet know introspectively that you were in pain at one time and not 
at the other.
  I shall not attempt to plug this particular gap in the manifestability argument, 
however.  For there is a rather more basic flaw in the argument, to which I shall now 
turn.  To deal with this more basic flaw, we will need to switch to a significantly 
different form of argument for physicalism.  Moreover, this alternative form of 
argument will be immune to the anti-physicalist appeal to non-physical introspective 
powers. 
1.6  Manisfestabilty is Not Enough
To understand the more basic flaw in the manifestability argument, recall how I 
earlier alluded to the possibility of different ways of understanding supervenience, 
depending on how strongly we read the "determine" in "physical features determine 
special features" (or, equivalently, on how strongly we read the "cannot" in "cannot 
differ in special features without differing physically").
  A weak version of supervenience would understand these notions in terms of natural 
necessity:  that is, it would take physical features to determine special features across 
all possibilities where we hold the actual laws of nature fixed;  equivalently, it would 
say that any two systems governed by the actual laws of nature cannot be different in 
any special respects without differing physically.
  A strong version of supervenience would do it in terms of "metaphysical" necessity 
rather than natural necessity:  supervenience requires that physical nature determines 
special nature across all possible worlds whatsoever;  no two possible systems of any 
kind can be different in some special respect without being physically different.
  Now only the stronger of these versions of supervenience constitutes a plausible 
explication of physicalism.  To see why, we need only consider epiphenomenalism, 
the doctrine in the philosophy of mind which holds that mental states "float above" 
the brain as distinct conscious phenomena, not responsible for any physical effects 
themselves, but nevertheless causally determined by the physics of the brain, and so 
incapable of varying without physical variation.  Epiphenomenalism implies 
supervenience in the weak sense, since it implies that, if we hold all natural laws 
constant (including in particular the putative epiphenomenalist laws by which  by 
physical brain states cause conscious states) then physical nature will determine 
mental nature:  identical physical brain states, plus the laws according to which 
physical brain states cause conscious states, will ensure identical conscious states.  
But epiphenomenalism clearly isn't a physicalist doctrine, since it explicitly specifies 
that conscious mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical ones.  So 
weak supervenience clearly does not suffice for physicalism.
  However, the same objection does not apply if we equate physicalism with strong 
supervenience.  For while epiphenomenalism does imply that the mental is fixed by 
the physical across all natural pssibilities, it does not imply that such brain-mind 
determination holds across all possibilities, including those possible scenarios where 
these epiphenomenalist brain-mind laws break down.  This is because 
epiphenomenalism insists that conscious properties are ontologically distinct from 
physical ones.  So it implies that it is metaphysically possible, even if not "naturally" 
possible, for a creature physically just like me, say, to have different conscious states, 
or indeed to have no conscious states at all.  While such a creature would violate 
epiphenomenalism's putative natural laws of mind-brain causation, and so fail to be 
"naturally" possible, epiphenomenalism allows that these laws themselves are not 
absolutely necessary, and so implies that such a creature is metaphysically possible.  
Conversely, the doctrine that such a creature is not  metaphysically possible would be 
inconsistent with epiphenomenalism's distinction of conscious mind from physical 
brain, and so would constitute a plausible explication of genuine physicalism.
  After all, strong supervenience says that it is metaphysically quite impossible for two 
beings to differ in some special property unless they differ physically.  But how could 
this be so absolutely impossible, unless the special property was itself in some sense 
itself physical?  If the special property weren't itself physical, then surely there would 
be metaphysical room, if not natural room, for it to float free of the physical realm, in 
the way the epiphenomenalist's conscious properties float free of physical properties 
in worlds with different brain-mind causal laws.  So it looks as if strong 
supervenienceÑthat is, the denial of any metaphysical room for special properties to 
float free of physical onesÑwill indeed ensure that special properties are physical.12
  To return to the original issue of this section, the basic flaw in the manifestability 
argument for physicalism is that it only constitues a good argument for weak 
supervenience, not for strong supervenience, and so fails to establish physicalism.  
The fault lies with the manifestability premise, that is, the premise according to which 
mental differences must manifest themselves in differential physical consequences.  
For any version of this premise strong enough to deliver genuine physicalism would 
blatantly beg the question against non-physicalist views like epiphenomenalism. 
  Consider what epiphenomenalists would say about the manifestabilty premise.  They 
would happily allow that mental differences will display themselves in differential 
physical consequences as long as the laws by which brain states cause conscious 
states are held constant:  given these laws, then different conscious states must have 
been caused by different physical states, and we can expect these physical differences 
to have different physical consequences.  But epiphenomenalists will point out that 
there is no need to expect this manifestability requirement to hold up across all 
possible worlds, including worlds where the actual brain-mind laws break down.  
After all, if we allow, as epiphenomenalists will, that there are metaphysically 
possible worlds in which I have physical duplicates with different conscious states, or 
with no conscious states at all, then we will not expect these mental differences, 
between me and my other-minded physical duplicates, to display themselves in any 
differential physical consequences.
  So epiphenomenalist anti-physicalists will see no reason to concede that the 
manifestability premise holds across all metaphysically possible worlds, even if it 
holds in all naturally possible worlds.  And correspondingly, they will not view the 
manifestability argument as providing any substantial reason to suppose that the 
mental supervenes on the physical across all metaphysically possible worlds.  They 
can allow that mental differences will display themselves in differential physical 
consequences as long as we hold all laws of nature fixed, and correspondingly 
concede the weak supervenience thesis that mental differences without physical 
differences are naturally impossible.  However this, as we have seen, falls short of 
physicalism proper.  Genuine physicalism requires strong supervenienceÑmental 
differences without physical differences are metaphysically impossible.  But 
epiphenomenalists will see nothing in the manifestability argument to force them to 
this stronger claim, for they will have no inclination to accept that all metaphysically 
possible mental differences must display themselves in differential physical 
consequence.13
1.7  The Causal Argument for Physicalism
Let me now turn to a somewhat different argument for physicalism, which I shall call 
"the causal argument".  This argument, like the manisfestability argument, will hinge 
on the completeness of physics.  But instead of appealing to requirements on the 
manifestation of mental states, it will appeal to the possession of causal powers by 
mental states.  This shift of focus will yield a more effective line of reasoning against 
anti-physicalist view like epiphenomenalism. 
Thus consider the following premise, which I shall call the "principle of mental 
efficacy":
Premise (3).  Every mental occurrence causes some physical effect.
Note now that, on just about any account of causation14, the following is an 
immediate corollary of the completeness of physics:
Premise (4).  All physical effects have complete physical causes ("complete" in the 
sense that those causes on their own suffice by physical law to fix the chances of 
those effect).
   Consider now some mental occurrence, and one of the physical effects which are 
required by (3).  For example, suppose you decide to lift your arm, and as a result 
your arm rises15.  By (4) this physical effect will also have a complete physical cause, 
which will presumably involve the neuronal and other physical antecedents of your 
arm rising.  So it follows that your arm rising has two causes:  a mental cause, your 
decision, and also a physical cause, your neurones firing. 
   Does this mean that such physical effects are always overdetermined, like the death 
of the man who is shot and simultaneously struck by a random bolt of lightning?  This 
doesn't seem right.  After all, when an effect is overdetermined by two causes, it 
follows that it would still have occurred if either one of the causes had been absent:  
the man would still have been killed by the lightning bolt even if he hadn't been shot, 
and vice versa.  But we don't similarly want to say that your arm would still have gone 
up even if you hadn't wanted to lift it, or, alternatively, even if different neurones had 
fired in your brain.
   The obvious conclusion is that your desire and your neurones are not two 
independent causes, like the shot and the lightning bolt, but are in some sense the 
same cause.  We need somehow to identify the mental cause with the physical cause, 
so as to avoid the conclusion that the movement of your arm was overdetermined16.
   Note how this argument differs from that in the last section.  There the aim was to 
show that the physical always co-varies with the mental, and the argument was that 
physical variation is needed to produce the external evidence for mental variation;  the 
trouble was that this argument only established co-variation across naturally possible 
worlds, which was too weak for physicalism.  In this section the aim has been to show 
that the mental is ontologically inseparable from the physical, and the argument has 
been that such a separation would imply an absurd proliferation of causal 
overdetermination;  if this ontological inseparability does follow, it will mean that 
there is no metaphysical room for mental properties to float free of physical ones, and 
so will establish genuine physicalism.
   It might seem as if the causal argument begs the question against anti-physicalist 
epiphenomenalism just as much as the manifestability argument.  Epiphenomenalists, 
after all, will deny the assumption of causal efficacy, just as they denied any strong 
manifestability premise.  So they will escape the causal argument too.  They don't 
need to explain why bodily movements aren't always overdetermined, since they don't 
admit they have mental causes in the first place.
  But there is a significant dialectical difference between the two cases.  There is 
nothing pre-theoretically objectionable about the denial of a strong manifestability 
premise:  nothing obvious will go wrong with our overall view of the world just 
because we allow the mere metaphysical possibility of mental differences without 
physical manifestations.  By contrast, it clearly flies in the face of any number of 
normal assumptions to deny that mental events have physical effects.  If my conscious 
thirst isn't what causes me go to the fridge for a beer, and my conscious map-reading 
isn't what causes me to choose one route rather than another in a strange city, and so 
on, then we are going to have to think again about most of our assumptions about the 
way the human world works.
  Given this, we can well ask why the epiphenomenalist wants to adopt the curious 
view that conscious mental states are causally inefficacious, especially given the 
availability of physicalist alternatives which avoid it.  The only plausible answer, I 
take it, is to do with consciousness:  epiphenomenalists are persuaded that any 
physicalist account of the mental will leave out the essential conscious features of the 
mental, and so are persuaded to postulate a distinct, non-physical realm of mental 
events, even at the cost of denying that the mental affects the physical.  I shall return 
to this issue in chapter 4 below, where I shall argue that there is nothing in 
consciousness that is left out by physicalism, and therefore that the epiphenomenalist 
denial of the causal efficacy of the mental is ill-motivated.
  Before proceding, let me quickly deal with one complication.  This relates to broad 
mental states.  We saw earlier how broad mental states complicated the 
manifestability argument.  Similar complexities arise in connection with the causal 
argument.
  Thus note how I illustrated the causal argument by focusing on the bodily effects of 
mental states, like arms rising, and then inferred that the mental causes of these bodily 
effects must be identical with their "neuronal causes".  However, this specifically 
neuronal conclusion sits ill with the possibility of broad mental states.  For broad 
mental states can't be identical with internal brain states, given that they depend on 
matters outside the skin.  Carl and Lrac differ in their respective desires for H2O and 
XYZ, even though they are internally physically identical.  In line with this, it seems 
wrong to say that their different desires cause their bodily movements:  bodily 
movements are surely caused by matters inside the skin, not by features that stretch 
outside.
  Still, the fact that broad mental causes can't be the same as brain states doesn't mean 
they can't be equated with any physical states, in particular with certain physical 
features of their possessors-and-relevantly-related-systems.  And it is not hard to see 
how the causal argument might be made to deliver this weaker conclusion.  All we 
need is a causal efficacy premise to the effect that broad mental states cause some 
"broad" physical consequences, even if they don't cause the bodily movements that 
result from neuronal causes alone.  And there seems no difficulty about this version of 
the efficacy premise.  For example, Carl's desire may cause a glass of H2O to move, 
where Lrac's desire will cause a glass of XYZ to move.  And then, with the efficacy 
premise so restored, we can use the causal argument to argue that Carl and Lrac's 
desires must be equated with those physical feaures of themselves-and-their-
surrounding-environments which are responsible for these broad effects. 
1.8  Generous Causation and Alternatives to Type Identity
I argued in the last section that the mental causes of physical effects must be the same 
as the physical causes of those effects.  Exactly how we construe this equivalence, 
however, depends on what view we take of the ontological status of causes in general.  
Some philosophers, most prominently Donald Davidson (1967), think that causation 
is a relation betwen events construed as "bare particulars" shorn of any general 
attributes.  However, there are good arguments for being dissatisfied with this 
anaemic view of causation, and for preferring to view causal relata as facts rather than 
as Davidsonian bare particulars17.  Accordingly, I shall assume the factual view of 
causal relata in what follows.
   However, if you view causation as a relation between facts in this way, then it may 
seem as if the causal argument is in danger of proving too much.  In particular, it may 
seem in danger of proving that mental properties must be type identical with physical 
properties, notwithstanding the intrinsic implausibility of this type identity claim. For, 
if causes are facts, then the causal argument's conclusion, that mental causes must be 
identical with physical causes, will require that mental factsÑsuch as that I am in pain, 
sayÑare identical to certain physical factsÑI have a certain brain feature, sayÑand 
these two facts cannot be identical unless the properties they involveÑbeing in pain, 
having that brain featureÑare themselves identical.
   Well, this type identity would indeed follow from the causal argument if we take a 
very strict view of causation, and insist that the only thing that can cause a physical 
effect is another strictly physical fact.  For then the principle of mental efficacy, 
according to which mental facts cause physical effects, can only be satisfied if mental 
facts are themselves instantiations of strictly physical properties.  However, suppose 
we understand causation in a more generous sense, and allow that an instance of a 
strongly supervening property causes the effects of those facts on which it supervenes.  
Then the principle of mental efficacy will only require that mental properties are type 
identical to physical properties or that they strongly supervene on physical properties.  
For as long as the latter possibility is realized, then it will still be true, in the generous 
sense, that mental facts cause the physical effects of the physical facts on which they 
supervene.
   As an illustration of this possibility, consider the functionalist view that mental 
states are causal intermediaries between perceptual inputs and behavioural outputs.  
The orthodox version of this view does not identify pain, say, with whichever first-
order property mediates causally between damage detectors and avoidance behaviour 
in any given species.  For this would have the "chauvinist" implication that species 
with different internal workings could not share the experience of pain.  Rather the 
standard functionalist view is that pain is a second-order property, the property-of-
having-some-property which mediates causally between damage detection and 
avoidance behaviour, which second-order property can therefore be present across 
beings with different innards.
   Now, on this functionalist view, pains can't cause bodily movements in the strict 
sense which requires identity with strictly physical facts.  For, if pains are 
instantiations of second-order properties, they cannot be identical with any first-order 
physical facts.  Still, such functionally understood pains can still be "realized" by 
physical properties, in that they can be present purely because some first-order 
physical fact which mediates between damage and avoidance is presentÑand in that 
case a pain will indeed cause bodily movements, in the generous sense in which 
superveners cause what their subveners cause.  For if a pain is so realized by a 
physical fact, then it will supervene on this physical fact, even though not identical 
with it, in that any metaphysically possible being with this physical property will be in 
pain, since it will possess the property-of-having-some-property which mediates 
causally between damage and avoidance.  
   Let me clarify my direction of argument here.  I am not at the moment concerned to 
uphold functionalism, nor, consequently, am I particularly concerned to argue that 
functionalist mental definitions are satisfied by physical states in humans18.  Rather I 
have introduced functionalism merely as an illustration of how facts that are not 
themselves physical facts can nevertheless cause physical effects, at least in the 
generous sense of causation.
   More generally, if we understand the causal argument in terms of the generous 
sense of causation, then the conclusion will be mental facts must in some way 
strongly supervene on physical facts (otherwise mental facts couldn't cause physical 
facts even in the generous sense, given the completeness of physics).  Functionalism 
offers one illustration of how this might be so, even when type identities are not 
available.  But my conclusion is not that functionalism must be true, only that the 
mental must somehow strongly supevene on the physical.
   For a further example of a theory of this form, consider Donald Davidson's view of 
the mental.  (Davidson, 1980, passim.  Though Davidson's view of the mental is 
standardly presented in harness with the Davidsonian view of causation mentioned 
above, it is helpful to separate out these two aspects of Davidson's thinking.)  
Davidson holds, in effect, that to be in a given mental state M is to be in some state 
which causes behaviour which would warrant the attribution of M to you.  This is a 
different theory from functionalism, since it makes essential appeal to the non-
scientific canons of interpretation which Davidson takes to govern our attributions of 
mental states to others.  But, just like functionalism, it allows room for the idea that 
the mental may be realized by the physical, and consequently strongly supervene on it.  
For if it is physical state P which causes the behaviour which warrants the attribution 
of mental state M to person X, then X will be M purely in virtue of being in P, and 
correspondingly any possible creature with P will have M, since it will have some 
state which causes behaviour which would warrant the attribution of M.
  So the Davidsonian view, like functionalism, will also satsify the requirement that 
mental facts should cause physical facts, at least in the generous sense.  Still, as with 
functionalism, I mention this, not as an argument for the Davidsonian view in 
particular, but simply as another illustration of how the requirement of supervenience 
on physical states allows the causation of physical effects, even in the absence of type 
identity. 
   I have no clear views about the full range of ways in which mental properties might 
supervene on physical ones.  Functionalism and Davidsonianism are two such options, 
but there may well be others.  However, there is no need to decide this issue here.  It 
will be enough if I have shown that some such view of the mental is demanded by the 
causal argument.
  Of course, there remains the option of embracing epiphenomenalism, and denying 
that the mental is efficacious, even in a generous sense.  As I observed earlier, the 
normal motivation for this unpalatable view is to do with consciousness, and the 
conviction that conscious states at least must be ontologically quite distinct from any 
physical states.  The question this raises, and to which I said I shall return in chapter 4, 
is whether this anti-physicalist convinction about consciousness rests on solid enough 
grounds to justify the radical step of denying that our thoughts and feelings affect our 
actions.  But for the moment I am content merely to point out that the minimum price 
for rejecting physicalism is epiphenomenalism.  Anti-physicalists need to deny some 
premise in the causal argument, and the line of least resistance is to deny the principle 
of mental efficacy.  
1.9  The Completeness of Physics Defended
There is an alternative, if less obvious, way to resist the causal argumentÑnamely, by 
denying the completeness of physics.  This assumption may seem initially plausible.  
But, as I allowed earlier, it is by no means entirely unproblematic.
   The central difficulty facing defenders of this assumption is an obvious dilemma 
about what they mean by "physics".  Either "physics" means the theory currently 
taught in university departments of physics and presupposed by articles in physics 
journals, or it means some ideal future theory that will succeed current theory.
   The trouble with the first horn of this dilemma is that, if the past form of physical 
theorizing is anything to go by, current physics is no doubt inadequate in certain 
respects, and in particular in failing to identify all the antecedents for certain physical 
effects.  So current physics is not complete.
   The trouble with the other horn, by contrast, is that we don't yet know what physical 
categories will be assumed by the ideal future physics.  So we scarcely seem to be in 
any position to maintain that those categories will suffice for complete explanations of 
all physical effects.
   However, I think there is a version of the second horn of this dilemma which will 
serve the purposes of the arguments of this chapter.  Suppose we simply define 
"physics" as the science of whatever categories are needed to give full explanations 
for all physical effects.  I accept, as above, that this science will be different from 
current physical theory, and thus that we don't yet know what it is.  But, even so, there 
is no difficulty about how we know that it is complete, for we have simply defined it 
so as to be complete.
   The obvious worry about this definitional strategy is that it seems to remove any 
significant content from the thesis of completeness, and thereby to make it doubtful 
that the thesis could have any substantial conclusions.  There are two dimensions to 
this worry.  First, the definitional strategy characterizes physics as the science of 
whatever is needed to explain "physical" effects.  But what are "physical effects", if 
we haven't yet specified what counts as "physics"?  Second, even if we had some 
independent hold on "physical effects", the proposed strategy would still make the 
completeness thesis an empty analyticity, for it simply defines "physical" categories 
as all those needed to explain physical effects, from which completeness immediately 
follows.
   Let me deal with these two worries in turn.  To deal with the first worry, I propose 
that we simply postulate some pre-theoretically given class of paradigmatic physical 
effects, such as stones falling, the matter in our arms moving, and so on.  If we take 
this class to be independently given, then we can effectively characterize the rest of 
physics as all the categories that need to be brought in to explain those paradigmatic 
physical effects.
   But this still leaves us with the second worry, that even we help ourselves to a pre-
theoretical class of paradigmatic physical effects, we are still defining physics in such 
a way as to make the completeness of physics a matter of definition.  I still need to 
explain how substantial conclusions about the truth of physicalism could possibly 
follow from such a definition19.  
   My answer is that no substantial conclusions follow from the completeness of 
physics per se.  But they do follow from the joint assumption that (a) physics is 
complete and (b) that it does not make any use of psychological categories.
   Let me explain.  In itself, the above definition of physics leaves it open that 
psychological categories may turn out to be needed as an essential part of physics.  
Maybe psychokinesis is true, and there are physical effects that can't be accounted for 
without making essential mention of distant volitions.  Less exotically, maybe some 
bits of behaviour can't in fact fully be accounted for purely in terms of muscular 
activation, neuronal activity, and so, without bringing in extra mention of prior mental 
states.  Now, if psychological categories do turn out to be needed to give full 
explanations for physical effects in this way, then the issue of whether psychology 
supervenes on the physical, as I have defined it, becomes trivial.  Psychology will 
indeed supervene on the physical, but only because it is included in the physical, not 
because psychological variation requires variation in something else.
   On the other hand, if psychology is not part of the physical, as I have defined it, 
then the arguments of this chapter will go through as before.  That is, if psychological 
categories are not in fact ever essential to explaining physical effects, then physics, in 
the sense of whatever is needed to explain physical effects, will be both complete and 
exclusive of psychology, and the arguments of this chapter will show that 
psychological states are non-trivially supervenient on physical states.
   It seems to me highly unlikely that the psychological will turn out to be part of the 
physical.  Current physics, I take it, aims to develop a complete theory of paradigm 
physical effects in terms of the categories of energy, field and spacetime structure.  I 
am quite prepared to believe that this this aim cannot be achieved, and that the 
categories of current physics will need supplementation before we can get a genuinely 
complete theory.  What I do not believe is that they will need supplementation by 
psychological categories.
   I am here making an empirical claim.  The history of science yields a great deal of 
empirical evidence about the kind of causes that are responsible for the motion of 
stones and other kinds of matter.  This evidence does not, perhaps, allow us to 
formulate a definitive list of all the necessary categories.  But it does, it seems to me, 
provide sufficient grounds for concluding that mental categories are not among 
them.20
   To help see what is at issue here, it is illuminating to consider Descartes' views on 
the matter.  Descartes did think that there were physical effects that could not be 
explained without bringing in mental antecedents.  Descartes believed that the total 
amount of motion, in the sense of mass times speed, is conserved, according to 
regular laws, in all material interactions, and therefore that the speeds of all material 
bodies are determined by earlier such speeds.  However, unlike us, Descartes did not 
believe in the conservation of momentum, considered as a directional quantity, and so 
did not think that the direction of motion of material bodies was necessarily 
determined by prior physical factors.  And it was this gap that Descartes exploited to 
explain how the mental, although ontologically quite distinct from the physical, can 
nevertheless affect the physical:  the mental interacts with the physical in the pineal 
gland, and influences the direction of motion of certain particles (though not their 
speed, since this is always fixed by prior physical states).
   To hold that the psychological is part of the physical is to believe a version of what 
Descartes believed, namely, that there is a gap in the determination of certain physical 
effects, which can only be filled by mental occurrences.  And this is what seems 
highly unlikely to me.  It is one thing to hold that the current categories of energy, 
field and spacetime structure leave a gap in the determination of certain physical 
effects.  It is another to hold that this gap cannot be filled without bringing in the 
mental.  If that were true, after all, then the obvious moral would be that physicists 
needn't build expensive particle accelerators to generate theoretically anomalous 
physical phenomena;  instead they could find plenty of currently inexplicable physical 
phenomena simply by looking inside people's heads.21  I think we have good 
empirical reason to reject this possibility as absurd.
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psychological and the physical.  But the analysis will be of general significance, as the 
structure of my arguments will indicate.
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full physical specification of the antecedents of some large-scale physical outcome 
won't necessarily be illuminating for us humans, in the way that an explanation using 
chemical or biological or psychological terminology might be (cf Putnam, 1978, p 42).  
No matter.  My argument only requires that the physical antecedents fix or cause the
physical outcome, not that they illuminate it.  David Owens (1992) is even more 
particular, and would baulk at this last use of "cause", on the grounds that causes 
aren't causes unless they illuminiate.  Again no matter.  My arguments need only 
whatever is left in the notion of cause after we take away the anthropocentric factor of 
illumination.
7   Cf Crane (1991).
8   As it happens, when I do return to the completeness of physics in 1.9, I suggest 
that this thesis itself can most usefully be understood as an analytic truth, rather than 
as an empirical claim.  However, when we do read it in this way, the burden of my 
argument for physicalism is then taken up by some closely related empirical 
assumptions.
9  This argument is found in McGinn (1982, p 29) and further discussed by 
McFetridge (1990, p 86).  In Papineau (1990) I tried to run the argument with a 
weaker version of premise (2), requiring only that mental differences have some 
different consequences, not necessarily physical ones.  But when I presented this 
version of the argument at the Analysis 50 Conference in Cambridge, Tomis Kapitan 
showed me that it begged some crucial questions.
10  Why doesn't the argument work in reverse, and also show that all physical 
differences must depend on mental differences?  The essential reason is that the 
mental is not complete.  Even if we accept, as is not entirely implausible, the "mental 
manifestability of the physical" ("if two systems are phyiscally different, there must 
be contexts in which this will produce differential mental effects"), we cannot 
conclude that these differential mental effects must always depend on prior mental 
differences, for lack of the premise that mental effects are always fixed by mental 
antecedents.
11   This is the version of the argument articulated by McGinn.  He does, however, 
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actual laws of nature, but need not be ontologically intertwined with them?  Well, the 
virtue of strong supervenience is indeed that it ensures an ontological dependence of 
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13   For further discussion of the failings of the manifestability argument, and for 
other criticisms of the original English version of this chapter, see Steward (1996) and 
Witmer (1998).
14   David Owens (1992) is an exception.  But, as I said in footnote 6, I could grant 
Owens his stronger notion of cause, and simply phrase my arguments in terms of a 
weaker one.
15  Are bodily movements, like arms raising, mouths moving, and so on, properly 
counted as physical effects?  Strictly, no.  "Arm" and "mouth" are biological terms, 
not physical ones, and it is doubtful that they can be reduced to physical notions.  So 
for full accuracy we ought to take the physical effects of mental causes to be the 
motion of bits of matter, which happen to be in arms, mouths, and so on.  However, it 
will smooth the exposition if I can be less than strict on this point.
16  This form of argument for token congruence is to be found in Peacocke (1979, ch. 
III.3).  It has obvious affinities with the discussion in Davidson (1970).
17  For a defence of this view. see Mellor (1987).   Another alternative to Davidson's 
view of causation is to allow that causes are events, but insist that events are 
instantiations of properties, rather than Davidsonian bare particulars (Kim, 1973).  
However, Mellor (op cit)argues that "events" of this kind are simply a subspecies of 
facts.
18  David Lewis (1966) does argue from a version of functionalism to mind-brain 
identity.  Lewis's argument shares one premise with my causal argument, namely, the 
completeness of physics.  But where my other premise is only that each particular 
mental cause has some physical effect, Lewis makes the stronger functionalist 
assumption that different mental types can distinguished by their characteristic causal 
role in mediating between physical causes and effects.  (He then concludes, from the 
completeness of physics, that such roles are always filled by physical states.)
19  Crane (1991) argues on just these grounds that the version of my argument for 
physicalism in (Papineau, 1990) collapses into triviality.
20   Let me guard against one possible source of confusion here.  When I say that a 
compete physics excludes psychology, and that psychological antecedents are 
therefore never needed to explain physical effects, the emphasis here is on "needed".  
I am quite happy to allow that psychological categories can be used to explain 
physical effects, as when I tell you that my arm rose because I wanted to lift it.  My 
claim is only that in all such cases an alternative specification of a sufficient 
antecedent, which does not mention psychological categories, will also be available.  I 
need the thesis that psychological terms are not included in the minimal set which 
provides sufficient conditions for all physical effects, not that they are not included in 
any such set.
21  Cf. Lycan (1987, pp 2-3).
